We define the notion of linguistic structure on a small category, in order to provide a more formal description of ontology logs, also known as ologs, introduced in [18] by R. E. Kent and the second author. Out of our formalism emerges a new notion of linguistic functor, which can be understood with almost no category-theoretic background, thus adhering to the aesthetic of [18] , and also extending the concept of meaningful functor defined in [14] by the second author. We also present the notion of an olog complex, a network of overlapping ologs arranged as a simplicial complex.
Introduction
The theory of ontology logs (ologs for short) was introduced by Robert Kent and the second author in their paper [18] , as a framework for knowledge representation. Ologs are basically mathematical categories that have been wrapped in natural-language English. They have been applied in several branches of science and engineering, [3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 17] , as a tool for various kinds of formal modeling.
Typically, a person who wishes to record and document some of her knowledge or ideas will do so in prose, e.g., a scientist publishes ideas in the form of research papers. Ologs offer the ability to express complex ideas using a special type of diagrams. Namely, the objects of study and the relationships between them can be represented as the objects and arrows in a category. The difference between an olog and a category is that an olog has additional structure: each object is labeled with a noun phrase (thus forming a type) and each arrow is labeled with a verb phrase (thus forming an aspect), so that reading source-arrow-target yields an English sentence. There is a formula for composing sentences end-to-end into a new sentence, when following a path of arrows through an olog, and a pair of equivalent paths (also known as a commutative diagram) in the category is understood as a declared fact equating the two English sentences.
The primary goal of this paper is to present a linguistic description of mappings between ologs. As ologs are defined from categories, mappings between ologs should be defined in terms of mappings between categories, namely functors. However, these functors need to respect the linguistic descriptions on each node and arrow. For example, there is an obvious functor (namely the identity) between the following ologs: has as weight (in kilograms) (1) But would this functor mean anything? We will rephrase this question in § 3.1 like this: "is there an author willing to endorse that this functor is linguistic?" In this paper we explain the difference between a (linguistic) map of ologs and a mere functor between their underlying categories. We will address this particular case (1) in Example 3.1.11.
To some extent, this issue was considered in [14] , where the authors introduced the concept of meaningful functor. One limitation of their approach is that it depends on a strong assumption, namely that every olog C is equipped with a functor I∶ C → Set, and that this functor somehow controls the meaning of the olog. Such a set-valued functor is called an instantiation, a term coming from database theory [15] . The idea is that I represents a kind of database of examples, or instances, for the various types, aspects, and facts in the olog. For example, if an author is writing an olog C describing a familiar real-world situation, then for a type c (e.g., c = a cat) the set I(c) represents all the examples of c (all cats) known by the author. Somewhat strangely, however, there is no requirement in [14] that the database functor I should in any way correspond to the linguistic structure on the olog C. Similar issues existed for morphisms between ologs: they were not required to respect the linguistic structures, which are what distinguish ologs from categories.
In this paper, we remedy these issues. First, we allow ologs to exist without being instantiated; that is we disentangle ologs and their instantiations. This way, the set of documented examples can evolve over time, without changing the olog to which they refer. On the other hand, we add a constraint to instantiations: for a set-valued functor to count as an instantiation of an olog C, it must conform to the linguistic structure, the labelings, on C. The same goes for functors between ologs: in order for a functor to count as a mapping between ologs, it must conform to the linguistic structures involved.
We also take more care to explain the relationship between an olog and its authors. We introduce the concept of endorsement: an author can endorse that a certain concept or relationship between concepts makes sense, that a certain fact is true, etc. The author set endorsing an olog is part of its structure. This allows us to explicitly define the notion of olog complex, which is a network of connected ologs, endorsed by overlapping author sets.
Here is an expert-level view of this paper. To every category C, we define a category Ling(C) of linguistic structures L on C. An olog is defined as a pair (C, L), consisting of a category and a linguistic structure on it. This construction is contravariant in the base category C, and allowing the base category to vary, we get a fibration Olog → Cat, where Olog denotes the category of ologs, and Cat the category of small categories. Instantiated ologs are defined similarly: to each category C we define a category Inst(C) of instantiated linguistic structures (L, I) on C, and again we obtain a fibration InstOlog → Cat, where InstOlog denotes the category of instantiated ologs. An (instantiated) olog complex is roughly a simplicial complex whose n-simplices are equipped with ologs that are agreed upon by n + 1 authors. All of this will be explained in the main sections of the paper. This paper is organized as follows: § 2 introduces the category of linguistic structures Ling(C), as well as the category Inst(C) of instantiated linguistic structures, on a category C. In § 3 we define mappings between ologs and also mappings between instantiated ologs. To do so, we introduce the notion of linguistic functors and instantiated functors, as mentioned above. The latter of these is an adaptation of the "meaningful functor" notion defined in [14] .
Most of the results have a linguistic element and are not purely mathematical. However, with the help of several linguistic postulates scattered throughout the paper, fairly formal proofs are possible. All of these proofs are given in full; however, being written mainly written for a non-mathematical audience, they are saved for the end; see the Appendix § A.
Background and Notation
We will assume the reader is familiar with some basic concepts from category theory, such as opposite categories, isomorphisms, functors, and natural transformations. Readers without category-theoretic background may still benefit from reading the less categorical definitions and results, skimming the category theory, and trying to digest the examples. The books [1, 16] are good sources for category theory, with many illustrations. Some knowledge on fibrations, Grothendieck constructions, and cartesian arrows will be helpful, although certainly not vital, to have a deeper understanding of § 3. We refer the reader to the books [2, 11, 10] , or online to [13, 20] , to recall these concepts.
The word "category" will always mean a small category unless otherwise stated, i.e., the collections Ob(C) and Mor(C) of objects and morphisms (also called arrows), respectively, are sets. By a path of length n in a category we mean a composition of n morphisms f = f n ○ f n−1 ○ ⋯ ○ f 2 ○ f 1 . Suppose that p, q ∈ Ob(C) are objects and that f and g = g m ○ g m−1 ○ ⋯ ○ g 2 ○ g 1 are paths between them. We will represent that there is an equality f = g of these composites in C by drawing a checkmark symbol ✓, as in the following commutative diagram:
g m Figure 1 : Commutative diagram: equality between two paths.
Ologs and instantiated ologs
This section is devoted to formalizing the definition of ologs found in [18] , using a new construction that we will call a linguistic structure. We suggest that readers who are unfamiliar with ologs consult [14, §1, 2, 3, and 4] or [18, §1, 2, and 3] . Note that the later sections of these papers also discuss pullbacks and pushouts within an olog; we do not address these notions in this paper, for the sake of "brevity".
Linguistic structures
Recall that an olog, as defined in [18] , is a category whose objects and morphisms are labeled with noun phrases (i.e., types) and verb phrases (i.e., aspects), respectively, in order to model a conceptual situation. Commutative diagrams in an olog are called facts; they are equivalences between two sentences in the English language. Importantly, these types, aspects, and facts must follow certain guidelines, to ensure that the category-theoretic meaning is aligned with the conceptual and linguistic meaning intended by the authors. The most important of these rules is that the label of each arrow a → b corresponds to a mathematical function [21] . All of these notions are author-dependent, as we will make explicit using the notion of endorsement, as in Definition 2.1.1.
Functional sentences
Suppose that N represents the noun phrase "a person". Then we denote this by ⟨⟨N ⟩⟩="a person"; we call ⟨⟨N ⟩⟩ the reading of N (and say that N is read ⟨⟨N ⟩⟩). Similarly for verb phrases. If ⟨⟨V ⟩⟩="is" and ⟨⟨N ′ ⟩⟩="a mammal", then we denote the concatenated string, "a person is a mammal" by ⟨⟨N ⟩⟩⟨⟨V ⟩⟩⟨⟨N ′ ⟩⟩ or simply by ⟨⟨N V N ′ ⟩⟩. can be read as a sentence, "a person has as mother a woman". This sentence expresses that for anything that could be called "a person" there is something it "has as mother" that can itself be called "a woman". This seems true, but more important for us, it seems to represent a function: each person has only one mother. Each person who understands these concepts probably has an example of a person (namely himself) and the woman that corresponds to the mother he has. Thus the arrow text is a verb phrase that functionally connects ⌈a person⌉ and ⌈a mother⌉ in the sense of Definition 2.1.2.
We can contrast the above situation with the following:
a woman a canine has as dog
?
Because not every woman has a dog, and some women have two dogs, the arrow text is a verb phrase that does not functionally connect its source and target noun phrases.
In this case we say that Σ 1 and Σ 2 are concatenatable and that their concatenation, denoted Σ 1 ; Σ 2 , is the sentence read
In the concatenation Σ 1 ; Σ 2 , the verb phrase ⟨⟨V 1 N 2 ⟩⟩"which"⟨⟨V 2 ⟩⟩ will be called the concatenated verb phrase and may be denoted by the symbol V 1 ; V 2 .
It follows that for any two concatenatable sentences Σ 1 and Σ 2 as in Definition 2.1.3, we have
Example 2.1.4 Consider the diagram below:
p an amino acidh has / / p an amine grouph includes / / p a nitrogen atomh
The sentences Σ 1 ∶="an amino acid has an amine group" and Σ 2 ∶="an amine group includes a nitrogen atom" are concatenatable, and their concatenation is Σ 1 ; Σ 2 ="an amino acid has an amine group, which includes a nitrogen atom".
A reader may not be able to endorse either of these as functional (does every amine group really contain exactly one amino acid, or can their be none or many?). But in fact, they are broadly endorsed. Postulate (2.1.7) says that an author who endorses concatenatable sentences Σ 1 and Σ 2 must also endorse their concatenation Σ 1 ; Σ 2 .
Declared equivalences Let s be an author such that s ⊧ Σ i and s ⊧ Γ j , for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 ≤ j ≤ m (and so s ⊧ Σ and s ⊧ Γ, by Postulate 2.1.7). If s is willing to declare that Σ ≃ Γ is an equivalence, i.e., a fact, we write s ⊧ [Σ ≃ Γ], and say that s endorses Σ ≃ Γ.
As in [16, §2.3.3.4] , an equivalence Σ ≃ Γ can be given the following English-language interpretation (where x, y 1 , and y 2 are just symbols, to be copied verbatim):
"For any" ⟨⟨N 1 ⟩⟩ x, "we know that" x ⟨⟨V 1 N 2 ⟩⟩, "which" ⟨⟨V 2 N 3 ⟩⟩, "which" ... ⟨⟨V n−1 N n ⟩⟩, "which" ⟨⟨V n N n+1 ⟩⟩ "that we call" y 1 , "and we know that" x ⟨⟨W 1 M 2 ⟩⟩, "which" ⟨⟨W 2 M 3 ⟩⟩, "which"... ⟨⟨W m−1 M m ⟩⟩, "which" ⟨⟨W m M m+1 ⟩⟩ "that we call" y 2 ; and the fact is, y 1 and y 2 are the same for any x. 
✓
First, note that the concatenation of the top and right arrows yields the sentence "a person lives at an address, which includes a city", and the diagonal arrow is read "a person lives in a city". According to Figure 2 , the equivalence between these two sentences is read as the assertion For any person x, we know that x lives at an address which includes a city y 1 , and we know that x lives in a city y 2 ; and the fact is, y 1 and y 2 are the same for any x.
Contrast that fact to the following diagram a person a city p an addressh a house number lives in lives at has its most affluent residence at includes which does not represent a fact (note the absence of the checkmark symbol ✓). In this case, the assertion indicating the equivalence between the two involved sentences would be read For any person x, we know that x lives in a city, which has its most affluent residence at a house number y 1 , and we know that x lives at an address, which includes a house number y 2 ; and the fact is, y 1 and y 2 are the same for any x.
This assertion is quite dubious, because there seem to be many city-dwellers whose house numbers are different from those of the most affluent resident in their city. Hence, we as authors cannot endorse it as a fact.
Some postulates about endorsement
Recall that a postulate is an idea suggested or assumed as true as the basis for reasoning, discussion, or belief. We make a few linguistic postulates throughout this document, starting with the next one.
Linguistic postulate 2.1.7 Let Σ 1 and Σ 2 be two concatenatable sentences as in Definition 2.1.3. If s is an endorsing author for both sentences s ⊧ Σ 1 and s ⊧ Σ 2 , then we will assume that s endorses their concatenation, s ⊧ Σ 1 ; Σ 2 . Definition 2.1. 8 We say that a symbol L is a linguistic expression if it represents a noun phrase, a verb phrase, a sentence or a fact. Definition 2.1.9 We say that a linguistic expression L is universally endorsed if, for every author s with any conceptual scheme, we have s ⊧ L.
For example, the following postulate says that every olog author must endorse the sentence "a bottle is of course a bottle" as functional. We will later postulate (in 2.2.6) that this sentence encodes the identity function.
Linguistic postulate 2.1.10 We will assume that there is a unique verb phrase e, read ⟨⟨e⟩⟩ = "is of course" such that for every noun phrase N , the sentence (N, e, N ) is universally endorsed. We call e the unit verb phrase.
The following postulate says that the unit verb phrase introduced above is unital with respect to the string concatenation defined in Definition 2.1.3. 
In other words, endorsement by an author set requires a sort of honesty: if an author s endorses a concept when he or she is part of a larger group T , he or she must endorse it when she is in any subgroup S ⊆ T .
(2) Postulates 2.1.7, 2.1.10, and 2.1.11 will be also assumed for every author set S. Specifically, the following statements are valid for every author set S: Definition of linguistic structure on C
We are now ready to define the notion of linguistic structure on a category. In Definition 2.1.20 we will discuss how two linguistic structures on the same category can be related.
Definition 2.1.15 A linguistic structure L on a category C consists of a finite set of authors S, together with the following data:
For each object c ∈ Ob(C), the identity arrow id c ∶ c → c is assigned the verb phrase L(id c ) = e, with e the unit verb phrase as in Definition 2.1.5.
(3) For every commutative diagram in C of the form specified in Figure 1 , the corresponding concatenated sentences, obtained according to Definition 2.1.3, are endorsed as equivalent by S, i.e.,
We call S the author set of L and denote it by Auth(L) = S.
An olog is a pair (C, L), where C is a category and L is a linguistic structure on C.
Example 2.1. 16 We run through Definition 2.1.15 in the case of linguistic structure shown here: 
Each object has been assigned a noun phrase, and each arrow has been assigned a verb phrase. The two paths from 1 to 3, namely 1 → 3 and the composition of 1 → 2 followed by 2 → 3, have been declared equivalent. This fact is read
For any person x, we know that x has as parents a pair (w, m) where w is a woman and m is a man, which yields as w a woman y 1 , and we know that x has as mother a woman y 2 ; and the fact is, y 1 and y 2 are the same for any x.
Identity morphisms are not drawn in our pictures, but for example the identity on ⌈a person⌉ must be assigned the sentence "a person is of course a person" by L. There is a universallyendorsed fact that the For any person x, we know that x is of course a person which has as mother a woman y 1 , and we know that x has as mother a woman y 2 ; and the fact is, y 1 and y 2 are the same for any x.
Morphisms of linguistic structures on C Definition 2.1.17 Let S and T be two author sets and let d∶ S → T be a function. For any
We say that a function d is a delegation if for every S ′ ⊆ S and every linguistic expression L, the following implication is true:
Remark 2.1.18 Note that Definition 2.1.17 implies that if T is an author set containing S, then the inclusion S ↪ T is a delegation, and thus every author in S is his or her own delegate, as a member of T (See Remark 2.1.14).
Like all results in this paper, the proof of the following proposition can be found in § A.
Proposition 2.1.19
The collection of author sets and delegations, denoted Del, is a category. There is a faithful functor U ∶ Del → Set, sending each author set to its underlying set.
Thus Remark 2.1.18 says that if U (S) ⊆ U (T ), then there is an associated delegation d∶ S ⊆ T .
Definition 2.1.20 Suppose given two linguistic structures L and L ′ on a category C, with
consists of the following data:
as shown in Figure 3 . 
Remark 2.1.21 Both the arrows between objects in an olog, denoted →, and the component arrows for maps between ologs, denoted ↝, are assigned functional verb phrases. Although we use differently-shaped arrows to denote them, the equivalence in Figure 3 is of the usual kind, as in Definition 2.1.5. It can be read in English, as in Figure 2 :
we call" y 1 , "and we know that"
we call" y 2 ; and the fact is, y 1 and y 2 are the same for any x.
Example 2.1.22 Consider the following linguistic structures L and L ′ on the category
The phrase "legitimate child" is an old-fashioned term for a child who was born in a marriage, which itself also required to be between a man and a woman. Let Auth(L) = Auth(M) be an author set who endorse these definitions, and let α 0 ∶ Auth(M) → Auth(L) be the identity function. Suppose these authors also endorse the following sentences as functional:
"a legitimate child was born in a marriage" "a father is a man" "a mother is a woman".
In other words, they endorse ⟨⟨α(1)⟩⟩:= "was born in"; ⟨⟨α(2)⟩⟩:= "is"; and ⟨⟨α(3)⟩⟩:= "is" as component verb phrases α(c) for c ∈ {1, 2, 3} = Ob(C).
At this point, they have endorsed every object and arrow (both → and ↝ in the diagram below: The checkmarks are drawn if the authors also endorse the corresponding facts. For example, a legitimate child has a father who is a man, and a legitimate child was born in a marriage, which includes a man. The point is, they had better be the same man! If the authors Auth(L) endorse the three components of α and the two facts, as shown above, then they have endorsed a morphism of linguistic structures α∶ L ↝ M.
The category of linguistic structures on C Now that we have a solid notion of linguistic structures on a category C and the morphisms between them, we are ready to define a category. Different ologs on the same underlying category have been considered before in other fields, such as biology and materials science [7] . In [7, Figure 2] for example, such ologs are compared via the notion of functor, and two ologs are said to be analogous if there exists a functorial isomorphism between them. Other interpretations of analogies are given in [4, 17] .
Motivated by this, we present next in Definition 2.1.24 a notion of analogy which fits all these and which is based on Definition 2.1.20. Later on we will use this notion of analogy to introduce a special type of linguistic functors (See Definition 3.1.8). 
by all authors, such that for every c ∈ Ob(C) one has that α ′ (c); α(c) ≃ e and α(c); α ′ (c) ≃ e.
In this case we say that L and L ′ are (formally) analogous. In other words, the head of a parliamentary government X is a prime minister, which in a presidential system corresponds to a president, namely the head of the presidential government corresponding to X. Because this morphism has an inverse β∶ L ′ → L, constructed analogously, for which the composites α ○ β and β ○ α are "of course" the identity, the linguistic structures L and L ′ are formally analogous.
Instantiations
In this section we study instantiated ologs. These are ologs for which each type has been assigned a set of examples. The authors of an olog should, and generally do, know more than just some types and relationships; they should also have in mind some examples of these types and relationships. For example, someone who writes an olog about dogs, say including the arrow ⌈a dog⌉ has → ⌈a name⌉, probably knows some examples of dogs and their names. This information can be stored in an instantiation of the olog, which we will define in Definition 2.2.7.
Instantiating an olog-filling it with conforming data-serves three purposes:
i. It gives users a place to store data about-examples of-their subject of interest.
ii. It validates the olog as a mathematical structure.
iii. It differentiates between different author sets who endorse the same conceptual scheme (olog).
The first of these purposes is probably the most important, but it is also straightforward, so we briefly explain the other two. Issues of functional connectivity and endorsed facts (see Definition 2.1.2 and 2.1.5) rely on the authors' understanding of mathematical functions and their compositions. By instantiating an olog, the users validate that understanding.
Another reason to instantiate an olog is to differentiate one group of authors from another, even if they use the same conceptual scheme. For example, consider the following linguistic structure:
One author set may be interested in the fathers of US politicians (e.g., George W. Bush's father is George H. W. Bush), whereas another set may be interested in the fathers of famous mathematicians (e.g., Emmy Noether's father is Max Noether). The same olog can house multiple instantiations.
The mathematical motivation behind instantiations comes from the concept of set-valued functors C → Set as database instances, introduced by [6] and rediscovered by the second author in [15] . The same notion was defined for ologs in [18] , where it was assumed that every olog, say (C, L), comes equipped with such a functor C → Set. We find three problems with this:
i. An olog can exist before one has recorded the corresponding examples.
ii. The examples should have something to do with the linguistic structure.
iii. Two authors may have the same olog but different examples.
We have commented on iii above, and i is straightforward. We explain ii., which is probably the most important, in Remark 2.2.1.
Remark 2.2.1 In [18] , there was no assurance that the functor I∶ C → Set had anything to do with the linguistic structure on C. So a type c = ⌈a dog⌉ would be mapped to a set, but there was nothing ensuring that it was a set of dogs. Of course, such a thing cannot be ensured mathematically, but in Definition 2.2.2 we do the next best thing, and provide a sentence for authors to endorse. (1) Let N be a noun phrase. One says that x is a token of N if x is an example to which the noun phrase ⟨⟨N ⟩⟩ applies. If s is an endorsing author s ⊧ N , and x is a token of N according to s, we say that s endorses x as a token of N ; this will be denoted by s ⊧ (x ∶ N ). and s ⊧ (y ∶ N 2 ). Suppose that s agrees that the following sentence, denoted V (x, y), is true: V (x, y) ∶= x "is" ⟨⟨N 1 ⟩⟩ "which" ⟨⟨V N 2 ⟩⟩, "namely" y.
In other words, s agrees that x corresponds to y via the function corresponding to V . In this case, we write s ⊧ V (x, y) and say that s endorses the correspondence V (x, y) between x and y.
Example 2.2.3 Consider the person-father olog (C, L) from Figure (3 (1) Let N be a noun phrase and x be a token of N . We say that S endorses x as a token of N , denoted S ⊧ (x ∶ N ), if S ⊧ N as in Definition 2.1.13, and all s ∈ S have agreed to a common sense in which x is an example of the concept ⟨⟨N ⟩⟩ (and thus s ⊧ (x ∶ N ) for every s ∈ S).
(2) Let (N 1 , V, N 2 ) be a sentence, and x and y be tokens of N 1 and N 2 , respectively. We say that S endorses the correspondence V (x, y) between x and y, denoted S ⊧ V (x, y), if S ⊧ V as in Definition 2.1.13, and all s ∈ S have agreed to a common sense in which V (x, y) is a valid relationship of examples (and thus s ⊧ V (x, y) for every s ∈ S), and that they can defend it as members of any S ′ ⊆ S.
Remark 2.2.5 Note that we have S ′ ⊧ (x ∶ N ) and S ′ ⊧ V (x, y), for every S ′ ⊆ S.
We now postulate that the unit verb phrase and composition of verb phrases act like the identity function and function composition for instances.
Linguistic postulate 2.2.6 Let S be an author set.
(1) Suppose given endorsements for concatenatable sentences, S ⊧ (
by Postulate 2.1.7 and Remark 2.1.14 (2). Suppose also that S endorses tokens S ⊧ (x ∶ N 1 ), (y ∶ N 2 ), (z ∶ N 3 ) and correspondences S ⊧ V 1 (x, y) and S ⊧ V 2 (y, z). Then we will assume that S ⊧ (V 1 ; V 2 )(x, z).
(2) Suppose given an endorsement S ⊧ (x ∶ N ) for some noun phrase N . Then we will assume that S ⊧ e(x, x), with e as the unit verb phrase defined in Postulate 2.1.10.
Definition 2.2.7 Let L be a linguistic structure on a category C, with S = Auth(L). We say that a functor I∶ C → Set conforms to L if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(1) For every object c ∈ Ob(C), each element x ∈ I(c) is endorsed by S as a token of L(c), i.e., S ⊧ (x ∶ L(c)).
(2) For every arrow f ∶ c → c ′ in C and every element x ∈ I(c), the correspondence
Given an olog (C, L) and a functor I∶ C → Set conforming to L, we refer to I as an instantiation of (C, L), to the pair (L, I) as an instantiated linguistic structure on C, and to the whole triple (C, L, I) as an instantiated olog.
It is this notion, that an instance should conform to the linguistic structure, which we find missing in [18] ; see Remark 2.2.1. We adopt a tabular description similar to that used in [15] , except with column headings taken from (4). Using it, we can record the data of a functor I∶ C → Set as follows: This table then shows two correspondences, associated to the arrow labeled "has":
• George W. Bush is a person, which has a father, namely George H. W. Bush; and
• Emmy Noether is a person, which has a father, namely Max Noether.
An author who endorses the four tokens and two correspondences shown here then also endorses I as an instantiation of the olog (C, L).
Definition 2.2.9 Let S and T be two author sets. A delegation d∶ S → T , as in Definition 2.1.17, is said to be instantiated if the following two implications hold for every S ′ ⊆ S:
Proposition 2.2.10 The collection of author set and instantiated delegations forms a category, denoted InstDel. respectively. We say that a natural transformation p∶ I ⇒ I ′ conforms to α if for every every c ∈ Ob(C) and every element x ∈ I(c), the correspondence is endorsed S ′ ⊧ α(c)(x, p c (x)).
In this case we say that
is a morphism of instantiated linguistic structures.
We denote by Inst(C) the collection instantiated linguistic structures on C and morphisms between them. 
Mappings between ologs
In the previous section we studied how two different linguistic structures L and M, on the same category C, can be connected by a morphism L ↝ M in Ling(C). In this section we move to a more general setting in which we show how to relate linguistic structures that exist on possibly different categories. In the first part of § 3.1 we describe how to pull a linguistic structure back along a functor. We use this notion of pullback in the second part of § 3.1, where we introduce the notion of linguistic functor as a mapping between ologs. We later extend this concept in § 3.2 to obtain a notion of mapping between instantiated ologs, which we call instantiated functors.
Remark 3.0 It should be remarked that (linguistic) functors, as defined in Definition 3.1.8 do not provide the most general way we know to connect two ologs. In general, it is rare that one olog, O 1 , would map entirely into another olog, O 2 . The reason is that this would not only that require every linguistic expression endorsed by authors of O 1 to be endorsed by the authors of O 2 , but also that the entire concern of olog O 1 be of concern in olog O 2 . This will rarely be the case in practice for two ologs trying to communicate.
As discussed in [18, §4] , the proper approach, in general, is to find common ground, a third olog O with linguistic functors to both others,
We will discuss this idea more in § 4.
The category of ologs
Given a functor F ∶ C → D, category theory provides many examples in which structures on D can be pulled back along F to structures on C. In this section, we discuss how this is done for linguistic structures. In § 3.2 we study the analogous process for instantiated linguistic structures.
Suppose we are given two ologs, (C, L) and (D, M).
A mapping between them begins with a functor F ∶ C → D. Using a pullback construction associated to F , defined in Definition 3.1.2, we obtain a linguistic structure F * (M) on C. At this point, we have two linguistic structures on C, so we can relate them using a morphism L → F * M in Ling(C) (see Definition 2.1.20).
Putting these pieces together, we arrive at the notion of olog morphism, or linguistic functor ; see Definition 3.1.8.
The approach will be to construct a functor Ling∶ Cat → Cat op , where Cat denotes the category of small categories. This functor was defined on objects C ∈ Ob(Cat) above, in Proposition 2.1.23. The goal of the present section is to define it on morphisms in Cat, i.e., functors F ∶ C → D. Once Ling is defined as a functor, the category of ologs will be its Grothendieck construction, Olog = ∫ Ling. It may be useful to consult [16] or [10] . (1) Every c ∈ Ob(C) is assigned the noun phrase L(c) ∶= M(F c).
Pullback of linguistic structures
(2) Every f ∈ Mor(C) is assigned the verb phrase L(f ) ∶= M(F f ).
(3) Every commutative diagram in C, as in Figure 1 , is assigned the fact
If we set Auth(L) ∶= Auth(M), then L satisfies the conditions of Definition 2.1.15, making it a linguistic structure on C.
Definition 3.1.2 Let F ∶ C → D be a functor, and let M be a linguistic structure on D. We define the pullback of M along F , denoted F * (M) to be the linguistic structure denoted L in Proposition 3.1.1.
Example 3.1.3 In this example we show how pulled back linguistic structures look in general for a functor C → D. We will see that each morphism in C is labeled with either a unital verb phrase or a concatenation of verb phrases in D.
Consider the following functor F ∶ C → D where
Now suppose D is equipped with the following linguistic structure: for every s ∈ Auth(L ′ ). Finally, suppose that to each object c ∈ Ob(C) we assign the
Then the family {α(c) : c ∈ Ob(C)} of verb phrases and the function α 0 together constitute a morphism α∶ L ↝ L ′ of linguistic structures on C. 
We sometimes denote this functor by Ling(F ) ∶= F * .
Theorem 3.1.7 There is a functor
Ling∶ Cat → Cat op acting on objects as in Proposition 2.1.23 and on morphisms as in Proposition 3.1.6.
Linguistic functors
We begin this section by defining the category of ologs in Definition 3. 
We define the category of ologs, denoted Olog, to be the category whose objects are ologs and whose morphisms are linguistic functors. In other words, we can consider Auth as a functor as shown below:
It includes a delegation function
, so that every author in Auth(M) endorses both linguistic structures, and can thus evaluate possible morphisms between them. The map F ♯ also includes, for each c ∈ Ob(C), a c-component verb phrase
And for every morphism f ∶ c → c
This equivalence has an English-language interpretation, as in Remark 2.1.21. are the cartesian morphisms of this fibration. For more on this, the reader may consult [2, 11, 10, 13, 20] .
In the Introduction, we displayed two ologs (1) and a functor between them, and we said that it would be difficult to find an author to endorse that this functor carried linguistic meaning. By now we have enough definitions in place to be more precise about this.
Example 3.1.11 In this example we will show two ologs (C, L) and (D, M), and two functors F, G∶ C → D between their underlying categories. We will propose that G has very little chance of being extended to a linguistic functor, and explain our introductory comments about (1) in the process. On the other hand, we will find that it is straightforward to attach to F a morphism L ↝ F * (M) of linguistic structures.
Consider the following ologs: (6) In order to extend F and G to linguistic functors, we need maps F ♯ ∶ L ↝ F * (M) and
, as indicated in (6) . In the Introduction, we said that it will be difficult to find G ♯ . We begin by endorsing a certain F ♯ , and finally return to G ♯ .
To 
It just suffices to ask whether, if we measure the weight (in kilograms) of a man, regarding him either as an object or as an animal, we get the same number. We endorse that fact, thus providing a linguistic functor (F,
It is difficult to do the same for G ♯ . One can find functional verb phrases connecting ⌈a man⌉ to ⌈a woman⌉, for example "has as mother". But it is not straightforward to find a functional verb phrase connecting ⌈an object⌉ to ⌈a number between 20 and 120⌉ making the necessary diagram (analogous to (7)) commute. The reason, roughly, is that once one has regarded a man as an object, there is no aspect that applies to an arbitrary object which will correspond (i.e., commute with) with the mother-having aspect of an arbitrary man.
The upshot of this example is that linguistic structures give the necessary semantics to constrain mappings between ologs. This has important applications to databases, as we will show in Example 3.2.9.
The category of instantiated ologs
In this section, we provide a notion of mapping between two instantiated ologs (C, 
Pullback of instantiations
We first explain how instantiations are pulled back along a functor. The idea is to complement the pullback construction introduced in the previous section (see Definition 3.1.2) with the notion of data-pullback explained in [15, §2] . (1) For every object c ∈ Ob(C), we put I(c) ∶= J(F c).
(2) For every morphism f ∈ Mor(C), we put I(f ) = J(F f ).
Then I conforms to the linguistic structure F * (M) given in Definition 3.1.2. In other words,
) is an instantiated linguistic structure on C.
Definition 3.2.2 Let F ∶ C → D be a functor, and let (M, J) be an instantiated linguistic structure on D. We define the pullback of (M, J) along F , denoted F * (M, J), to be the instantiated linguistic structure denoted (F * (M), I) in Proposition 3.2.1. We sometimes denote the instantiation I by F * (J).
Proposition 3.2.3 Suppose given a functor F ∶ C → D and a morphism
be their pullbacks as in Definition 3.2.2, and let α = F * (β), as in Definition 3.1.5. Finally, let q∶ I ⇒ I ′ be the natural transformation given by q c ∶= r F c , for every c ∈ Ob(C).
Then q conforms to α in the sense of Definition 2.2.11; in other words,
is a morphism of instantiated linguistic structures on C. We define the pullback of (β, r) along F , denoted F * (β, r) to be the morphism (α, q), as defined in Proposition 3.2.3. We sometimes the natural transformation q by F * (r). 
We sometimes denote this functor by Inst(F ) ∶= F * .
Theorem 3.2.6 There is a functor
Inst∶ Cat → Cat op acting on objects as in Proposition 2.2.12 and on morphisms as in Proposition 3.2.5.
Instantiated functors
We begin this section by defining the category of instantiated ologs in Definition 3.1.8. This definition arises as the Grothendieck construction applied to Theorem 3.2.6, as in Remark 3.1.10. A instantiated linguistic functor between them, denoted
and a morphism F ♭ ∶ I ⇒ F * (J) of instantiations conforming to F ♯ , as in Definition 2.2.11.
We define the category of instantiated ologs, denoted InstOlog, to be the category whose objects are instantiated ologs and whose morphisms are instantiated linguistic functors.
Remark 3.2.8 As we noted for Olog and Ling in Remark 3.1.10, the category InstOlog can be recognized as the Grothendieck construction applied to the functor Inst∶ Cat → Cat op .
The functor InstOlog → Cat sending an instantiated olog (C, L, I) to its underlying category C is a fibration of categories, whose cartesian morphisms are very similar to "strongly meaningful" functors found in [14, §4] . See Remark 2.2.1.
Example 3.2.9 Suppose we are given two categories C, D, which we think of as database schemas (as in [15] ), a functor F ∶ C → D, and two instantiations I∶ C → Set and J∶ D → Set. Suppose that these two databases are to be merged. We are asked to find a morphism
In this example, we show that our job will be easier if F has been equipped with a morphism F ♯ of linguistic structures.
In order to emphasize the issue, we suppose that C and D are both single-object categories To compare instances on different schemas, we first need a functor between them. In our case there is a unique functor F ∶ C → D (it sends 1 ↦ a), so this is not an issue. With this functor in hand, we can pull back J to an instantiation F * (J) on C, and attempt to compare it to I.
The purpose of this example is to show that the choice of linguistic structure F ♯ on F is an important aid to making this comparison, i.e., to choosing a database homomorphism I ⇒ F * (J) out of the 5 2 = 25 possible choices. Consider the following two linguistic structures We denote the first by α and the second by β, i.e., α, β∶ L → F * M. Clearly, these linguistic structures give a useful hint at the intended semantics for the mapping. The only natural transformation I ⇒ F * J we endorse as conforming to α (see Definition 2.2.11) is p, and the only one that conforms to β is q, as shown below: 
Networks of interconnected ologs
In this section we discuss simplicial complexes of ologs, as in [18, §4] . The idea here is to have multiple authors, various subsets of which endorse different ologs. The network of ologs and their authors takes the shape of a simplicial complex, in which the vertices are single-author ologs, the edges are 2-author ologs, the triangles are 3-author ologs, etc.
Background on simplicial complexes
We begin by recalling the definition of simplicial complex. For a set V , we denote by P + (V ) the positive power set, i.e.,
If S ′ ⊆ S ⊆ V , we write S ′ ≤ S as elements of P + (V ), giving it the structure of a partial order. There is a function V → P + (V ), sending each element v ∈ V to the singleton subset {v} ∈ P + (V ). Recall that for any function f ∶ V → V ′ there is an induced monotonic function
Definition 4.1.1 Let V be a finite set, and X ⊆ P + (V ) a set of nonempty subsets of V . We say that (V, X) is a simplicial complex if
• X contains each singleton, i.e., {v} ∈ X for every v ∈ V , and
We call an element of V a vertex and an element of X a simplex.
consists of a function f ∶ V → W , and a functionf ∶ X → Y , making the diagram commute:
Note that iff exists then it is unique, and it is monotonic. The uniqueness implies that we can specify a morphism (f,f ) in terms only of the function f ∶ V → W on vertices.
The idea will be to put an olog at every simplex in a simplicial complex; the resulting network of ologs will be called an olog complex. Note, for example, that the triangle with vertices A, B, C is filled in; this indicates that {A, B, C} ⊆ X is a simplex, which of course implies that {A, B}, {A, C}, and {B, C} are also simplices, as indicated by lines. Because there is no line connecting A and F , we know that the subset {A, F } ∈ P + (V ) is not a simplex. Neither is {C, F, I}.
Olog complexes
Recall that a partially ordered set (X, ≤) can be considered as a category, whose objects are the elements of X, and which has a unique morphism S ′ → S if and only if S ′ ≤ S in X; see [16, §5.2.1] . In this sense, a morphism of simplicial complexes induces a functor between the associated categories. If (V, X) is a simplicial complex, we will use the following evident functors (or their opposites) below:
We will also use the following proposition to restrict author sets along the face maps of a simplex. Definition 4.2.2 An olog complex (resp., an instantiated olog complex) consists of a simplicial complex (V, X) together with a functor ω∶ X op → Olog (resp., ω∶ X op → InstOlog), such that the following diagram commutes:
resp.,
In other words, to every simplex S ∈ X we assign an (instantiated) olog ω(S), whose author set is S.
A morphism of (instantiated) olog complexes from
The collection of (instantiated) olog complexes and morphisms of (instantiated) olog complexes, denoted Ologx (resp. InstOlogx), forms a category. We make the case for our "contravariant" convention as follows. Suppose we have authors 1 and 2, and that each of them store some of their knowledge as an olog, say O 1 and O 2 . Suppose also that they share some common ground knowledge, also represented as an olog O 12 . Since both authors agree on it, it is likely a subset of their own individual ologs, i.e.,
there should be morphisms (linguistic functors)
But since Auth(O 12 ) = {1, 2}, whereas Auth(O 1 ) = {1} and Auth(O 2 ) = {2}, the delegation functions indeed need to point "the opposite way".
It is possible to argue that instead of common ground ologs, akin to "intersections", we should be using "unions of ologs"; this way, delegation functions would be covariant. For example, we can think of O 12 as an olog containing the knowledge of 1 and 2. In this case, there are inclusions
where O 1 and O 2 are related by aspects and facts endorsed by 1 and 2.
Before explaining our reasons not to prefer this convention, we run through the story anyway, in case it is of use to some readers. For any category C, we denote the category of covariantly delegated linguistic structures on C by Ling † (C) 6 This, as well as Inst(C), is still contravariant in the base category C, i.e., we have Ling
and the associated Grothendieck construction of covariantly delegated (instantiated) ologs will be denoted Olog † (respectively, InstOlog † ).
In terms of sharing ideas, the covariant conception is unwieldy. For two authors to share ideas, they must see and endorse the entirety of the union olog. This reduces privacy, as well as the chances that such sharing will occur. It adds a great deal of unnecessary clutter. Covariant olog complexes would contain very large amounts of data, most of which is redundant, because the individual ologs, plus their n-fold unions, are all necessarily stored. For these reasons, we felt compelled to adopt the contravariant delegation convention.
We conclude this section with a sanity check; namely, we construct a faithful functor Olog → Ologx. The idea is that each olog O has a finite set V = Auth(O) of authors, and thus we can assign that same olog O (with various subsets of its authors) to each subsimplex of P + (V ), forming an olog complex. This construction is functorial. 
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1.19: First, note that for every author set S, the identity function id S is clearly a delegation. The composition in Del is the composition of functions, which we know is associative. So it suffices to verify that the composition of delegations is a delegation, but that follows straightforward by definition.
Proof of Proposition 2.1.23: The functoriality Auth∶ Ling(C) → Del op is obvious by definition, once we establish that Ling(C) is a category. We first define composition in Ling(C).
Let L, L ′ and L ′′ be three linguistic structures on C, with S = Auth(L), S ′ = Auth(L ′ ), (1) On authors, we are given two delegations α 0 ∶ S ′ → S and α (2) Every object c ∈ Ob(C) is assigned the concatenated component verb phrase
) (see Remark 2.1.14 (1)). By Definition 2.1.20 (1),
, and so we obtain S ′′ ⊧ (L(c), (α(c);
by Postulate 2.1.7, i.e., S ′′ ⊧ (L(c), β(c), L ′′ (c)). Therefore, β(c) satisfies Definition 2.1.20 (2).
(3) Now suppose we are given an arrow f ∶ c → c
It follows that β defines a morphism between linguistic structures L ↝ L ′′ on C. The composition of morphisms in Ling(C) defined by (1), (2) and (3) above is associative, since the concatenation of verb phrases and the composition of functions are associative. 
Define the composite morphism (β, q) ∶= (α, p);
with β = α; α ′ as in the proof of Proposition 2.1.23, and q = p ′ ○ p∶ I ⇒ I ′′ as the natural transformation defined by the family {q c = p
We check that q conforms to β.
• First, note that β 0 is an instantiated delegation by Proposition 2.2.10.
• For every c ∈ Ob(C) and x ∈ I(c), we have that
is an instantiated delegation (see Definition 2.2.9 (2)). It follows by Postulate 2.2.
As the composition of morphisms in Ling(C), and the composition of functions are associative, we have that the composition defined above in Inst(C) is associative.
For each instantiated linguistic structure (L, I), the identity morphism on (L, I) is given by the pair (id L , id I ), with id L as defined in the proof of Proposition 2.1.23, and where id I is the identity natural transformation defined by id I (c) = id I(c) , for every c ∈ Ob(C). Note that (id L ) 0 is an instantiated delegation, and that id I conforms to id L , since s ⊧ id L (c)(x, id I (x)) for every c ∈ Ob(C) and s ∈ Auth(L), by Postulate 2.2.6 (2). It is easy to check that the morphisms (id L , id I ) are unital with respect to the composition defined above. Therefore, the collection Inst(C) defines a category.
Proof of Proposition 3.1.1: Conditions (1), (2) , and (3) in the statement of this proposition are endorsed by Auth(L) = Auth(M). On the other hand, it is clear that L(id c ) = e for every c ∈ Ob(C). Then the result follows.
(1) First, let N ∈ Ling(E) with S = Auth(N). Then for every c ∈ Ob(C) and every f ∶ c → c ′ ∈ Mor(C), it is easy to see that (Ling(F )(Ling(G)(N)))(c) = Ling(GF )(N)(c) and
Note that these equalities are endorsed by S, since S = Auth((GF ) * (N)). On the other hand, we have:
Then we have the equality Ling(F ) ○ Ling(G)(N) = Ling(GF )(N) between linguistic structures.
, it is easy to see that the equality Ling(F )(Ling(G)(γ))(c) = Ling(GF )(γ)(c) holds for every c ∈ Ob(C), which is endorsed by S ′ . Then we have the equality Ling(GF )(γ) = Ling(F ) ○ Ling(G)(γ) between morphisms in Ling(C).
By (1) and (2), the equality 8 follows.
The equality Ling(id C ) = id Ling(C) for every identity functor id C follows similarly.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1: We show that the functor I∶ C → Set conforms to F * (M).
Let S = Auth(F * (M)). Then by definition of F * (M), we have S = Auth(M). We check conditions (1) and (2) in Definition 2.2.7. Condition (1) follows easily. To check (2), let f ∶ c → c ′ be a morphism in C, and x ∈ I(c). Since J conforms to M, F f ∈ Mor(D) and
x ∈ J(F c), we have S ⊧ M(F f )(x, J(F f )(x)), or in other words S ⊧ F * (M)(f )(x, I(f )(x)), and hence condition (2) follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.3:
We only need to check that q conforms to α. Let S = Auth(L), c ∈ Ob(C) and x ∈ I(c). Then F c ∈ Ob(D), and x is a token of F c in the set J(F c). Since r conforms to β, we have that S ⊧ β(F c)(x, r F c (x)). In other words, S ⊧ α(c)(x, q c (x)). holds, it suffices to check that F * (r ′ ○ r) c = F * (r ′ ) c ○ F * (r) c for every object c ∈ Ob(C), by Proposition 3.1.6. But this equality follows easily, and so does Inst(F )(id M , id J ) = (id F * (M) , id F * (J) ), for every instantiated linguistic structure (M, J) on D.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.3: Let (V, X, ω) be an olog complex. Then it is clear that the identity id (V,X,ω) , given by the triple (id V , id X , id ω ), defines a morphism of complexes of ologs.
Now suppose we are given two morphisms (f,f , f ♯ )∶ (V 1 , X 1 , ω 1 ) → (V 2 , X 2 , ω 2 ), and (g,g, g ♯ )∶ (V 2 , X 2 , ω 2 ) → (V 3 , X 3 , ω 3 ). Now, define (g ○ f ) ♯ ∶ ω ○ g ○ f op ⇒ ω 3 as the natural transformation given by
, for every S ∈ X 3 , where the previous composition is defined in Olog.
Define the composition of (f,f , f ♯ ) and (g,g, g ♯ ) in Ologx by the triple
This composition is clearly associative, for which the identity morphisms (id V , id X , id ω ) defined above are unital.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.5: We divide this proof into three parts (1), (2) and (3). In (1), we define how Φ acts on objects. We do the same for morphisms in (2). Finally, in (3) we verify that Φ defined by (1) and (2) is indeed a functor.
(1) Let O be an olog, with V = Auth(O). We construct a functor ω ∶ P + (V ) op → Olog in order to get a olog complex (V, P + (V ), ω).
a. For every simplex S ∈ P + (V ), set ω(S) ∶= O S (see the paragraph after Proposition 4.2.1).
b. For every inclusion j∶ S ↪ T with S and T nonempty subsets of V , i.e., j is a morphism in P + (V ), define ω(j)∶ ω(T ) ↝ ω(S) as the linguistic functor formed by the identity functor id C ∶ C → C, and the morphism O T ↝ O S of linguistic structures on C whose c-components (with c ∈ Ob(C)) are all given by the unit verb phrase e.
Then ω∶ P + (V ) op → Olog acting on objects as in a., and on morphisms as in b., defines a functor.
It is not hard to see that the triple (V, P + (V ), ω) defines an olog complex, that will be denoted Φ(O). 
where Φ(F, The equality Φ(id C , id L ) = id (V,P+(V ),ω) is easy to verify.
Therefore, Φ defines a functor Olog → Ologx.
